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Abstract: In his article "Intermediality and Aesthetic Theory in Shklovsky's and Adorno's Thought" 
Oleg Gelikman places the concept of intermediality in the context of the unresolved conflict between 
philosophical aesthetics and aesthetic theory. The conflict originated in the response of an influential 
generation of thinkers to the crisis of the neo-Kantian schools and the emergence of modernism in the 
1910s. Despite superficial similarities, aesthetic theory is neither a revamped aesthetics of the subject 
nor a theoretical vindication of modernism. By severing the connection between subject-object epis-
temology and theory of artworks, the practitioners of aesthetic theory such as Victor Shklovsky and 
Theodor W. Adorno transformed metaphysical aesthetics into a critical historiography of cultural pro-
duction. Gelikman argues that, while incomplete, aesthetic theory can nonetheless be effective in ana-
lyzing the function of intermediality in the environment dominated by the resurgence of naturalistic 
and epistemological interpretation of the aesthetic. 
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Intermediality and Aesthetic Theory in Shklovsky's and Adorno's Thought 
 
"Intermediality" arrived at the scene of cultural production both as a reaction to the appearance of the 
artworks composed of various media and as a name for a new — "inter-medial," "multi-modal" or 
even "post-medial" — condition of the general symbolic economy. While the descriptive adequacy, in-
deed phenomenological necessity, of the concept in specific cases (like those of Thomas Struth's Video 
Portraits or Jean-Luc Godard's Voyage(s) in Utopia) is beyond question, the extension of the concept 
beyond such descriptive uses remains tentative and subject to disagreement. Fortunately, the re-
sistance to "intermediality" happens to be as significant and revealing a phenomenon as the pertinent 
applications of the concept itself. At the risk of laying undue stress on the obvious, I consider the 
morphology of the word itself. Although less explicitly than "idea idea," "intermediality" wants to say 
the same thing twice, for both of its constituent parts, "inter-" and "media," designate "between-
ness." Holding up a mirror to each other, "inter-" and "media" communicate a sense of stasis. There-
by, they shift our attention onto the movement within the inter-medial dimension, rather than through 
it. While the word is new, it presses into service an old, indeed archaic argument for the centrality of 
the medium to representation: it can be found in Aristotle's Poetics, Lessing's Laocoön, and the newer 
Laocoöns that proliferated in the twentieth century beginning with Irving Babbitt's The New Laocoön: 
An Essay on the Confusion of the Arts (1910). Rather than being a stranger, then, "intermediality" is a 
baby in the media-specificity basket, the latest addition to the long-suffering, yet tenacious Laocoön 
family. The resistance to the term, I would suggest, has much to do with the recognition of this asso-
ciation, and a suspicion that the "talk of intermediality" will raise the ghosts of the disagreements sur-
rounding medium-specificity and the epistemological stances that radiate from this "bewitched spot" of 
critical theory. (To name some of this stances: David Bordwell's conceptualization of "style" as a me-
dia-specificity placeholder; Noël Carroll's demotion of media-specificity; Friedrich Kittler's techno-
romanticism; theories of post-medial condition such as Henry Jenkins's "convergence" (for an over-
view of the debate, see Pethı). Instead of speaking directly to the current promise of intermediality 
(or the lack of thereof), in what follows I sketch a transition other than the one from the mono-medial 
to inter-medial production, namely from "aesthetics" to "aesthetic theory." Because, as I alleged 
above, the term itself comes from the traditional, media-centric epistemology of the aesthetic, the two 
transitions cannot be divorced, and the critical, non-descriptive, hypothesis-forming value of 
"intermediality" will depend on how and whether it connects with the practice of "aesthetic theory."   
By the time European modernism came of age in 1910s, systematic aesthetics became entrenched 
as a vigorous publishing industry supplying multi-volume expositions of the categories of aesthetic 
validity; inevitably, the artworks appeared incidental to the epistemological interests that would lead 
them through formal arguments like prisoners on a chain gang. When all was said and done, this flow-
ering of aesthetic discourse turned out to be deceptive. Instead of bringing the transcendental account 
of cognition to systematic closure, Theodore Lipps, Johannes Volkelt, and Hermann Cohen, to name 
just a few, laid bare the limitations of the neo-Kantian critical project as such and thereby cast in 
doubt the viability of grounding the aesthetic in theory of knowledge. To put this point in historical 
terms, the reading of Neo-Kantian aesthetics led those schooled in neo-Kantian epistemology — think-
ers as diverse and influential as Heidegger, Adorno, Benjamin, but also Bakhtin, Lukács, and 
Rosenzweig — to abandon its project of establishing transcendental frameworks of validity. At the 
same time, this experience directed them to pursue equally foundational projects on post-
epistemological premises, be they of ontological, historicist, or meta-ethical stripe. Walter Benjamin's 
quip regarding Hermann Cohen's concept of experience — "The category of origin [Ursprung] is not 
therefore, as Cohen holds, purely logical, but historical" (The Origin of German Tragic Drama 46) — 
summed the logic of the response of the entire generation that rushed to neo-Kantianism only to re-
ject it. Today, the fact that aesthetic theory — and I set this expression in opposition to aesthetics — 
emerged in the decade following the arrival of modernism seems logical: the tension between the con-
ceptual apparatus of traditional aesthetics and the artistic output of the time was simply too great. To 
cite some well-known examples: Shklovsky protested that, although Khlebnikov's poems contained no 
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representational imagery or references to mental acts, they were art no less than those poems that 
presumably did. Similarly, Theodor W. Adorno quickly became convinced that atonal compositions 
were not arbitrary experiments, but represented a historical development of Western musical lan-
guage beyond the limits that the aesthetics of music designated as natural. The monumental certain-
ties of traditional aesthetics became untenable, even comic: "Whoever wishes to define the conceptual 
invariants of natural beauty would make himself as ridiculous as Husserl did when he reports that 
while ambulating he perceived the green freshness of the lawn" (Aesthetic Theory 70, my emphasis). 
Here Adorno mocks the idea that aesthetic properties like "freshness" can be perceived at all, thereby 
undoing the subordination of aesthetic qualities to the cognition of "objects." Green can be seen, but 
"freshness" can only be felt. Derivation of aesthetics from the rationalist epistemology of the senses 
could no longer be taken for granted. When subjected to genealogical reconstruction, it was quickly 
re-identified as an article of faith belonging to the intellectual mythology of the Enlightenment.  
In light of the above, it is hardly surprising that, rather than trying to correct philosophical aes-
thetics, the proponents of aesthetic theory such as Adorno and Shklovsky argued that it failed to sup-
ply a coherent account of any art, including the classical art whose characteristics it elevated into in-
variants via Winkelmann and Hegel. This did not mean, however, that the concerns and concepts of 
the traditional aesthetics were to be disgarded. Instead, aesthetic theory aimed to work through or, to 
use Adorno's expression, "re-orientate" the categories of the aesthetic. Aesthetic theory can then be 
defined as a re-appropriation of classical aesthetics in the service of a different critical practice, its 
"redemption through second reflection" (Aesthetic Theory 343).   
Given the tastes of its champions, it is tempting to see aesthetic theory as an extension of 
modernism into the field of theory. Although it originated in the shock the modernist works delivered 
to the traditional norms of interpretation, aesthetic theory moved beyond and eventually against the 
epistemological commitments that conditioned this shock. For instance, by presenting Modernism 
morphologically (i.e., as a device of alienating representational content or a type of ornamental form), 
Shklovsky and Adorno treat it as a development within a history of art. Thereby, they contradict 
Modernism's apocalyptic vision of its mission as breaking the continuum of history and ushering a new 
age not just for art, but for mankind. Precisely because of the temptation to conflate the spontaneous 
ideology of modernism with the positions of aesthetic theory, it is important to contrast the two. In 
the Russian context, Shklovsky, otherwise a sympathetic analyst of modernist works, consistently ex-
posed the modernist claims to rupture with the past as self-serving illusions of autonomy: "Creation, 
even when driven by the ideal of revolutionary art, is always tradition-based. The violation of the can-
on is only possible in its presence, and blasphemy presupposes a religion which is not yet dead. There 
is a 'church' of art in the sense of the community of those who feel it. This church has its canons cre-
ated by the sedimentation of heresies" (Gamburgskii Schet 89) … "All this talk [i.e., of the end of art] 
is not that frightening. One had thrown a bomb, but the bomb cannot explode such phenomena as 
climate — and art continues to exist and metamorphose" (Gamburgskii Schet 294; because of the 
controversy about the English translation of Shklovsky's texts, I am using the original Russian texts 
with my translation). In Shklovsky's ripostes to the modernist fables of self-creation, we observe a 
prescient shift from epistemological tropes towards those of cultural ecology. As species of magical 
thinking, the modernist messianism constituted a "subjective" moment of creative practice. As such, it 
must be analyzed as the ideological motivation of this practice, not the rule for its interpretation:  
 
[Revolutionary theater of Vsevolod Meyerhold, Sergei Eisenstein's teacher and a theoretician of Proletkult] did not 
have its audience yet. They thought that revolution was a [Biblical] flood. Everything that existed "before the flood" 
was false. One must begin from the beginning. As its core, this destructiveness had joy, not reason. They thought 
it would be good to replace words with some kind of signs and, in any case, to annul what was once called "image-
ry," i.e. using words figuratively. They thought this was suspect. … One should not judge people solely on the basis 
of what they said about themselves. People cannot formulate what they wish to achieve, that which the time wish-
es to achieve through them, that which must take place. Alongside with the action of time, one finds personal ver-
bal behavior; very often, it is taunting and false, because it wishes to amaze… (Eizenshtein 70-71) 
  
In contrast to the modernists themselves, for Shklovsky, modernism did not signify the breakthrough 
into the world of immediate sensations and unshackled subjectivity. Nor did it signal the end of art 
rooted in bourgeois conventions. Reflecting upon the experience of modernism in hindsight, Shklovsky 
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will sum up his view in the following provocative shift of rhetorical register: "Communism is not a dif-
ferent planet, a different solar system, but a different stage of life, a heritage that includes into itself 
the work of humanity. The old cannot be lost because it exists in us anyway. Precisely in order to alter 
it, one must re-read it and think it thorough" (Eizenshtein 72). Modernism is not an abolition of the old, 
but a different relation to its persistence. Re-interpreted as the communist stage of art, modernism 
stands for the moment of re-appropriation of art's mis-conceptualized historical essence, the moment 
when, for the first time, the widest range of material became available for working-through. In con-
trast to Clement Greenberg or Herbert Read, neither Shklovsky nor Adorno can be understood as 
apologists of modernism. This is so not only because on occasion they both proved to be bitter and 
unforgiving critics of modernist works. There is a more substantial reason for thinking of them as orig-
inators of aesthetic theory instead: recovering the historical intelligibility of the aesthetic relations of 
production, rather than championing the artworks they saw as significant, represented their true am-
bition. 
What are some other distinguishing features of aesthetic theory? Modernism inherited from the 
traditional aesthetics the notion of the artwork a self-sufficient entity, even a paragon of a transcend-
ent identity: "What has survived from antiquity must be good, just like the Russians who can survive 
their harsh upbringing" (Kant, Notes and Fragments, 64). Aesthetic theory, on the other hand, argues 
that the artwork is a living hieroglyph of a historical process:  
 
In the course of history, works that were not produced as art or were produced prior to the age of its autonomy are 
able to become art, and the same is possible in the case of contemporary works that challenge their own status as 
art. … Equally, what once was art may cease to be art. The availability of traditional art for its own depravation has 
retroactive power. Innumerable paintings and sculptures have been transformed in their own essence to mere dec-
oration a result of their own offspring. Anyone who would decide to paint cubistically in 1970 would be providing 
posters useful for advertising, and the originals, too, are not safe from being sold off cheap. The enigmatic charac-
ter of artworks is intimately bound up with history. It was history that once changed them into enigmas and con-
tinues to do so; conversely, it is history alone, which invested them with authority, that keeps them from the em-
barrassing question of their raison d'être. (Aesthetic Theory 286) 
 
The picture of historicity presented here offers a sharp rebuttal to the traditional idea of a master-
piece as an object exempt from human injustice. Artworks are not self-subsisting monads or objecti-
fied mental acts of their creators; they are monads that depend upon history in order to maintain their 
air of self-subsistence. Thus, from the standpoint of aesthetic theory, artworks are not born, but both 
born and un-born; they arrive, but do not cease not to happen. Although they exist already, cultures 
treat them as if they do not. In a perverse fulfillment of their wish for permanence, artworks are re-
introduced into being through categorization, description, reading, performance, translation, etc. Each 
one of these acts renders simultaneously the work more permanent and more transient, more datable, 
and more transportable. Because the artwork depends on social reproduction for its air of autonomy 
from it, the artwork is alterable all the way through. Even its once-upon-a-time enigmatic essence 
may eventually be transmuted into a convenient design idiom. In this manner, Adorno tells us, the 
cubist paintings are performing an elaborate suicide via their imitations in commercial art of the 1970s; 
the same retroactive decrepitude is afflicting much of the minimalist art today. Because of this faith-
fulness to the retroactive shock which modernism delivered to the history of art, aesthetic theory pro-
jects an image of historical becoming which is sui generis. Following Ian Hacking's suggestion, this 
type of historicity may be called dynamic nominalism. Its prototype is not progressive maturation of 
the form, transcendental constitution of the world or coming to self-awareness of the subject, but the 
aftershock the future delivers to its own past through the looping processes Hacking describes as 
"feedback" and "feedforward."  
 As critical historiography, aesthetic theory liberates criticism from the apologetic relationship to 
its object; its primary aim is not to interpret the content of the work or define its historical significance, 
but to transmit the work as a type of historical becoming which is yet incomplete. Shklovsky's writings 
both early and late furnish salient examples of critical practice of this type. Despite appearances, his 
work cannot be comfortably assimilated either to formalism or historicism. In many of his texts from 
the 1920s (and culminating in the 1928 "In Defense of the Sociological Method"), Shklovsky engages 
both but only to pit them against one another in a rhetorical stand-off without a winner. The steps of 
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his argument may be summarized as follows: against causal historicism, Shklovsky deploys the idea of 
construction. With its help, he shows the apparent "reflection" of historical conditions to be an artifact 
of compliance with the dominant convention of form. Thus, the appearance of the peasant life in Mau-
passant's short stories has more to do with conventions of didactic plot than with the history of the 
nineteenth-century agriculture. 
While attacking the vulgar sociological readings of narrative, Shklovsky simultaneously rejected 
post-Romantic accounts of aesthetic production drawing a direct connection between the dominant 
properties of artworks and mental faculties of their producers. Against the cognitive or existential jus-
tifications of aesthetic formalism (a strategy of self-validation seized upon by the modernists of all 
stripes, from Kandinsky to Pollock), he severs the causal connection between form and the epistemo-
logical activity of the subject. The work does not represent what or how the subject (figured by the 
creator of the work) came to know, but sets the stage for the re-emergence of form out of the struc-
tured interaction of its materials. Shklovsky insists that "form" as commonly understood is a dominant 
structural convention. As such, it has little to say about particular works. In poetry, for instance, we 
associate form with prosody; yet prosody does not belong to the poem but to language as a whole; 
the form of the poem is constituted in part by its rhythm, i.e. a unique pattern of interaction between 
prosody and stress (in a syllabic material like Russian, for instance). Because form, now understood as 
constellation of materials, is function of the historical process of art, it cannot be identified with the 
acts of cognition or creation; these take place, but the traces they leave in the work escape the legis-
lation of its producer. The idea that meaning inheres in the work is itself the element of semblance 
that, in order to appear, needs to be triggered by the mechanisms extrinsic to the work. Rather than 
reproduction of genre conventions or artifact of empathy, Shklovsky's form is a function of the histori-
cal variability in the normative, phenomenal and structural materials used in the work. To illustrate his 
point with an example, one could argue that the influx of vers libre into Russian poetry in the 20th cen-
tury has made prosodic verse appear to lack spontaneity and subjectivity. As a result, the pre-
modernist works acquired a veneer of rigidity; even for those who, like Joseph Brodsky, continued to 
abstain from blank verse, ostentatious violation of the prosodic norm became the new rule. Because of 
this parallax-like nature of form (it exists both as a permanent structure latent in the work and as a 
variable function of the work within the context of the genre or tradition; thus, it appears both inside 
and outside of the work), the authors tend to misperceive or be puzzled by the form assumed by their 
work. With deliberate exaggeration, Shklovsky used to assert that the influential artists always mis-
perceive the effective form of their art because the structures that emerge from their works eclipse 
the conventions used to create them.  
Shklovsky liked to compare the production of art to Brown movement (Gamburgskii Schet 88).  
However, unlike the latter, the movement of art contains morphological regularities and laws of deri-
vation that we can use to formulate falsifiable hypotheses. The process of inquiry is open-ended be-
cause the effects of the changes in artistic practice are unpredictable and may modify our view of the 
past. As in Gaston Bachelard's historical dialectic of scientific concepts, Shklovsky's "method" consists 
in taking "instruction from construction" (13). In the succession of works, it does not recognize a de-
velopment of "poetic language," but a variation in linguistic constructions; literary history does not 
proceed toward mastery of medium or mimesis of "reality," but is propelled onward by conflict be-
tween normalized and resistant strata in its materials (linguistic, ideological, generic, etc.). Because 
determined by the persistence of the antagonism that is neither teleological nor dialectical, the history 
of art is a "process without a subject," as Althusser would say; or to invoke Bachelard once again, it 
requires "an ontology of complementarity less sharply dialectical than the metaphysics of the contra-
dictory" (16). In a 1926 letter to Tynianov, Shklovsky called such historical process "non-functional": 
"The relationship between the artwork and the artistic creation is also non-functional. Art has three 
freedoms relative to the writer: 1) freedom not to assimilate his personality, 2) freedom to choose 
[qualities] from his personality, 3) freedom to chose from any other material. We need to study facts 
[i.e., "literary facts" — Tynianov's expression — normative modifications in the historical series of art-
works], not problematic connections [i.e. connections of the causal or expressive type, such as "reflec-
tion" or "expression"]. We have to write about "War and Peace," not about Tolstoy. … Answer me, but 
don't draw me into history of literature. Let's deal with art. Having become fully aware that all the 
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quantities art deals with are historical quantities" (Tretia Fabrika, Eshche Nichego Ne Konchilos' 375; 
see the complete text of the letter in Gamburgskii Schet 302-03). 
Born in the dissatisfaction with aesthetics, aesthetic theory gravitated naturally toward the arts 
excluded from the Pantheon of Fine Arts. But what are to make of the remark like the following: "By 
its mere existence, every artwork, as artwork alien to what is alienated, conjures up a circus…" 
(Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 81)? Surely there is more at stake here than a defense of the minor genre 
or sentimental empathy with the discarded. Nor was Adorno alone in attributing theoretical signifi-
cance to the circus spectacle. As we shall see below, the claims the practitioners of aesthetic theory 
made on behalf of the circus had consistently showed a lot more ambition than required for upsetting 
the conventional taste. Shklovsky, Adorno, and Eisenstein all have at one time or another treated the 
circus as the critical model of the artwork. Why the circus, of all things? Shklovsky's 1919 sketch "The 
Art of the Circus" is a good place to start answering this question. He begins by recapitulating his the-
oretical position: "Each art possesses a fundamental premise [stroi] — that which transforms its mate-
rial into something felt as artistic. This principle finds expression in various compositional devices, in 
rhythm, phonetics, subject matter of the artwork. Device is that which takes non-aesthetic material 
and, by bestowing form upon it, turns it into a work of art" (Gamburgskii Schet 106). While this is an 
early and rather cursory statement of Shklovsky's view, one can already see that his notion of form 
was unorthodox from the beginning, for he makes both form and content into consonant aspects of a 
different dynamic — the interaction between the dominant constructive principle he calls stroi and the 
non-aesthetic material. Shklovsky does not evoke this peculiar view of the artwork in order to rest on 
his laurels, but to put it to the test. Immediately after, he declares that "The circus presents a strange 
state of affairs" (106). Why so? First of all, because the circus show does not possess the unity of sub-
ject matter or formal consistency traditional aesthetics silently presumes to be conditions of aesthetic 
experience tout court. Shklovsky points out that the program tends to be split into thematically unre-
lated parts. The circus has no subject matter, does not tell a story; it falls out of representational reg-
ister altogether. (On this score, Shklovsky would categorize the immensely successful Cirque du soleil 
as drama rather than a circus). And yet its disparate elements — "The snake-man, the strongman lift-
ing weights, the bicyclist doing the loop, the animal trainer depositing his well-greased head into the 
lion's mouth, the smile of the animal-tamer, the physiognomy of the lion" (107) — somehow do coa-
lesce into a coherent spectacle, even a kind of "heroic theater" (107). Aesthetic qualities cannot be the 
reason why, since the strongman and the animal tamer do not move about gracefully. More important, 
the plastic possibilities of human bodies are irrelevant on the arena: "Their movements are not rhyth-
mical — the circus does not need beauty. After all, all this is not even pretty. I write and feel guilty for 
using such an incomprehensible word as 'beauty.' Thank God, the circus does not need beauty" (107). 
The aesthetic coherence of the circus, therefore, must reside elsewhere than in the abstract aesthetic 
properties of its "ingredients." Rather, it is a product of the successful re-actualization of the funda-
mental dramatic premise (stroi) in a given performance.  
Shklovsky begins to elucidate this idea by pointing out that we experience acrobats without a 
safety net as more suspenseful than the ones using it; that trapeze artists operating under the dome 
are more impressive than the ones at the eye-level; clearly, we do not so much want to see better as 
to look at the events from an appropriate distance. The weights of the strongman must be authentic; 
if they are props, his act can no longer be perceived as valid. Shklovsky contends that the element 
that binds these disparate materials into an artwork-like unity is the fact that they all present a mo-
mentary overcoming of an insuperable difficulty: "But in the circus show there is, and it is always 
there, something shared [by all its acts]: the action of the circus involves overcoming a difficulty" 
(107). Each act presents us with a tableau of this overcoming all the more impressive for being mo-
mentary: because it is transient, this overcoming is human and reachable; because it is an overcom-
ing of an insuperable force, it is awe-inspiring. The appeal of each act resides in the fact that a defeat 
of gravity or taming of wild nature is shown to be possible here-and-now, rather than in the outcomes 
of this overcoming (there are none). The dramatic premise of the show distills the heroic moment to 
the bare essentials; echoing Lucretius, time and again, the circus celebrates the fact that "Death is 
nothing to us", and that, for some enigmatic reason, we tend to greet this rather counter-intuitive 
proposition with immediate assent first signaled by rapt attention and then by the outbursts of ap-
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plause. The coherence of the circus stems from the circulation of the affect attached to its sublime 
idea. The performers engender this affect as the immanent form of the show which the audience as-
sumes to be its literal content and the mirror of the possibility of the human shared by the performers 
and the audience: the animals "understand" the trainer! Every human body can transcend the limita-
tions of its muscular-skeletal structure! etc. The form here is not a quality immanent to the work, but 
the circuit of identifications and transferences repeatedly set in motion by the material architecture of 
the disparate acts: no fake weights, no safety net, no exaggerated roaring of the tigers, no theatrical 
cheerfulness of the trainers, etc. In short, the form is the circuit of the presentation of the work that 
must be rebuilt out of its artifactual components each time it is performed.  Thus, aesthetic theory 
sidesteps the question of the form's "cognitive" validity in favor of its performative stability; instead of 
placing form "within" the work or into the subject's inwardness, stroi or the work's principle of con-
struction stands for a reproducible pattern of aesthetic relations that collapses the difference between 
the producer, the performer and the audience; while this pattern is actualizable only from within the 
work, if effective, it makes the difference between the inside and the outside disappear or at least fade. 
In the example of the circus, this constructive principle is maximizing the appearance of difficulty in 
the process of overcoming. 
In the final paragraph of "The Art of the Circus," Shklovsky introduces the idea of the family re-
semblance (rodstvo) between circus and "heroic theater." He argues that in the circus one witnesses a 
return of the difficulty pressed upon the hero of tragedy. His example of such difficulty is Orestes's 
choice between the love of his mother and the law of the father, natural history and divine command. 
He murders the mother in the name of the father, thereby fulfilling the god's errand. However, the 
overcoming of the difficulty does not liberate Orestes; on the contrary, it makes the hero into a target 
of persecution by the Furies, and even Apollo who ordered the kill is powerless to protect him. The 
circus, on the other hand, says one can overcome the difficulty and get away with it, at least until the 
next act. In the circus, tragedy becomes modern. 
Why does the pursuit of "aesthetic theory" in the twentieth century pass through the circus? To 
begin with, the circus is a device of defamialirizing the structure of the work of art and exposing the 
narrowness of the aesthetic categories built on subject-object epistemologies. Second, by leveling the 
distinction between high and low art forms, it challenges the reader to see in the debased spectacle 
the trace of the integral art form, and thus take a measure of the decrepitude and falsification that 
affects the ideology of fine art. Because the circus threatens our lives, not our capacity for aesthetic 
judgment, we cannot perceive it as a valid art; it is much too alive and immediate for that. Aesthetic 
theory forces into the open the excessive powers of art that the modernists acknowledged in their 
nostalgic preference for the archaic or primitive form. It is the gambit of aesthetic theory that this 
"excessive" aliveness is what prevents any works or styles from disappearing to begin with. This is 
why it recognizes in the circus a prototype of all artworks.  
From today's point of view, Shklovsky's treatment of the circus may seem arbitrary and unsatisfy-
ing. After all, his brief essay does not mention a single performer. However, I argue that this type of 
reproach would be misplaced. Shklovsky evoked the circus less as a set of entertainment techniques 
than as a theoretical object allowing to de-legitimate the epistemological focus of aesthetics and to 
make a transition to a different critical practice. This elective affinity between the circus acts and aes-
thetic theory resurfaces in emphatic fashion in Adorno. In the unfinished Aesthetic Theory, it became a 
recurrent motif. For example: "Forms of the so-called lowbrow arts, such as the circus tableaux, in 
which at the finale all the elephants kneel on their hind legs, while on each trunk stands a gracefully 
posed, motionless ballerina are intentionless primal images (intentionslose Urbilder) of what the phi-
losophy of history deciphers in art; from its disdained forms much can be gleaned about art's dis-
guised secret" (287). Unlike the philosophy of history that places the spontaneous accord of nature 
and spirit either into the classical Athens or utopian future, the circus delivers it into presence as an 
inversion and interruption of the grotesque spectacle of domination, as if utopia has always been 
standing there, in every moment of our historical being. There is something embarrassing about this 
naïve apotheosis of reconciliation in the midst of historical existence, but only to a culture that has 
torn apart the possibilities which Adorno's circus tableau brings together: "The split [between low and 
high art] is the truth. It speaks the negativity of culture that is the sum of two spheres. This opposi-
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tion can least of all be reconciled by absorbing the light art into serious one or vice versa. This is what 
Culture Industry attempts. The eccentricity of the circus, peep show and the brothel to society is as 
embarrassing to it as that of Schoenberg and Karl Kraus" (Dialectic of Enlightenment 108). Positioned 
beyond the opposition between high and low, the circus finds itself in a mixed company indeed, 
flanked by the brothel and the peepshow on one side, Karl Kraus and Arnold Schoenberg on the other. 
Here one can see that Adorno's purpose is not to defend high art, but to promote those works whose 
formal impulses cannot be meaningfully parsed into high and low. Like Kraus's war on the language of 
journalism (or Schoenberg's assault on the language of music), the circus withdraws from the histori-
cal schema within which it exists and thus becomes the image of aesthetic relations liberated from the 
burden of fixed social identity. But this withdrawal is not complete: the circus also appears within the 
spectacles of entertainment industry. In fact, Adorno welcomes its vulgar features inasmuch as they 
offset the faux intellectualism of the socially-consecrated high art: "Traces of something better persist 
in those features of culture industry by which it resembles a circus — in the stubbornly purposeless 
expertise of riders, acrobats and clowns, in the "defense and justification of corporeal versus spiritual 
art" (Dialectic of Enlightenment 114). The circus is the image of redemption of art from the condition 
imposed upon it by the process of its integration into post-industrial, media-driven society. Indifferent 
to the increasingly aggressive incorporation of the aesthetic into processes of social differentiation, the 
circus remains the preserve of the art's original raison d'être. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno returns to 
this thought and, evoking Franz Wedekind's "corporeal art" once again, re-emphasizes that the circus 
is simultaneously an instance of low art and a prototype of insubordinate, non-alienated and non-
therapeutic art practice: "What Wedekind called "corporeal art" has not only remained beneath spirit-
ualized art, not only remained as its complement; in its intentionlessness, however, it is the primal 
image (Vorbild) of spiritualized art. By its mere existence, every artwork, as artwork alien to what is 
alienated, conjures up a circus and yet is lost as soon as it emulates it. Art becomes an image not di-
rectly by becoming an apparition but only through the countertendency to it" (Aesthetic Theory 81). 
Fearful of misunderstanding, Adorno goes out of his way to dispel the notion that he is advocating the 
imitation of the circus as a means of escaping the sociological situation in which art found itself in the 
twentieth century. In fact, he is making no suggestions whatsoever. Instead, he describing the 
aporetic and involuntary process of art's becoming resemblance. It  becomes mimetic of the experien-
tial contents precisely when it refuses to imitate their conventional forms and imagines that these 
have been left behind; by submitting its linguistic, plastic or musical materials to "purposeless" formal 
rigor similar to that of the circus virtuosos, it magically awakens the placeless, a-topic memories of 
suffering and unfulfilled longing lodged therein; this unforeseen resistance of the materials then acts 
as a counterpoint to the abstract content intended by the artist. The recurrent interplay of these two 
layers of materials conjures the architectonic unity of the whole in the midst of the resistant individu-
ality of parts that Shklovsky admired in his analysis of the circus. Adorno introduces a technical term 
in order to pinpoint the moment when such an unimaginable chiasmus between the autonomous and 
mimetic drives of the work occurs. He calls it a tour de force. Resembling the balancing act of the ac-
robats, tour de force reveals the secret inscribed in the image of circus — the fortunate dependence of 
art for its mimetic power on the excessive and absurd labors of formalization: "At the highest level of 
form the detested circus act is reenacted: the defeat of gravity, the manifest absurdity of the circus — 
why all the effort? — is in nuce the aesthetic enigma. This comes to bear on questions of artistic per-
formance. To perform a play or a composition correctly means to formulate it correctly as a problem in 
such a fashion that the incompatible demands it makes on the performer are recognized. The task of 
rendering that will do justice to a work is in principle infinite" (Aesthetic Theory 185). The same is true 
of another kind of "doing justice to a work" — the performance, or rather a counter-performance, 
which goes under the name of criticism.  
When I propose to relate "intermediality" to the transition from aesthetics to aesthetic theory, I do 
not mean to suggest that we are free to go back to the historical context in which the distinction be-
tween the two appeared. Nonetheless, there are significant factors that may justify revisiting the pro-
ject of aesthetic theory, mainly because the cultural assimilation of modernism — the main event that 
separates us from Adorno and Shklovsky — has occurred by the re-duplication of the regressively 
epistemological interpretation of aesthetics by the artists themselves. The epistemological construction 
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of aesthetic experience against which aesthetic theory rebelled remains firmly in place, and underpins 
the commercial uses of the senses and the production of falsely integrated selves via "interactive ex-
periences" on offer at the museums. The notion of the "audio-visual" as a direct and immediate con-
duit to knowledge replaces the unstable historicity of cultural objects with exercises in self-gratification. 
The enjoyment of all art by all is the communist promise once held out by the modernist program; but 
it was meant to result from the emergence of the art's historical intelligibility, not from the deploy-
ment of aesthetics as a shortcut to self-knowledge or comfort in the global world. Suspended between 
the epistemological aesthetics and critical historiography, intermedial works are being mobilized today 
both as the sites of recovery of authentic experience and agents of resistance against its pre-
structured character. The institutionalization of modernism, the mutation of the museum into the ve-
hicle of the art market and a supplier of meaningful experiences, the ascent of the audio-visual as a 
guarantor of transparency, the predictable dialectic which dictates that each new media claims more 
immediacy than the prior one while obfuscating the structure of aesthetic relations — all these devel-
opments need to be taken into account before the project of aesthetic theory can be resumed in the 
fashion that measures up to its ambitious beginnings. Where and how the notion of the intermedial 
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